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The commission of mass atrocities by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) is becoming increasingly
rife in contemporary armed conflicts. As the agent with a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force, the state has a responsibility to engage NSAGs for peace and security. Although, there is
an intensive academic debate on how best to engage NSAGs; either to use a coercive approach,
a non-coercive approach or a combination of both, contemporary reality suggests states often
opt for a non-coercive approach. This paper interrogates the utility of a non-coercive approach
in the engagement of NSAGs by using the amnesty programs implemented in the Niger Delta
and North East regions of Nigeria. This paper holds that it is not just enough to adopt a monodimensional non-coercive approach in engaging NSAGs. Any non-coercive approach that seeks to
foster sustainable peace must promote society-wide reconciliation and address the root causes of
the grievances that morphed into hostility and armed conflict.
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant change in the security architecture
of the modern state. Armed conflicts are no longer triggered by external threats; rather they are
the result of tensions, animosities, and confrontations between or among actors and forces from
within the territories of countries. Therefore, the security challenges facing modern states have
changed from the prevention of external aggression to the management of internal security crises,
which often emerge in different forms, including sectarian violence, ethnic conflict, resourcebased conflict, communal clashes, and other forms of militancy and insurrection against the state.
The emergence of this “new conflict” is typically referred to in extant literature as internal or
intra-state conflict.1 It has also been given several other descriptors by scholars. These include: low
intensity armed conflict,2 small wars,3 uncivil war,4 new war,5 Hobbesian war,6 war of the third

Jeronimo Delgado Caicedon, “Paramilitary Groups and National Security: A Comparison Between Cambodia and
Sudan,” African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Conflict, Conflict trends 4 (2009), 3-12.
2
Grant T. Hammond, “Low Intensity Conflict: War by another name,” Journal of Small Wars and Insurgencies 1, no. 3
(1990), 226-238; Max G. Manwaring, ed., Uncomfortable War: Toward A New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991); David J. Dean, ed., Low Intensity Conflict and Technology (Alabama: Air University Press, 1986);
Graham H. Turbiville, Jr, “Preface: Future Trend in Low Intensity Conflict,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement
11, no. 2-3 (2002), 155-163. DOI: 10.1080/0966284042000279957; Stephen Blank, et al., Low-Intensity Conflict in The Third
World (Alabama: Air University Press, 1988); Avi Kober, “Low-intensity Conflicts: Why the Gap between Theory and
Practice?,” Defense and Security Analysis 18, no. 1 (2002), 15-38; Michael L. R. Smith, “Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing
Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare,” Review of International Studies 18, no. 1 (January 2003), 19-37. DOI: 10.1017/
S0260210503000020; Stuart Kinross, “Clausewitz and Low intensity Conflict,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 1
(2003).
1
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Tarak Barkawi, “On the Pedagogy of ‘small wars,’” International Affair 80, no.1 (January 2004), 19-37. DOI: 10.1111/j.14682346.2004.00363.x; Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 3rd ed. (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1994); William J. Olson, “Preface: Small Wars Considered,” Annals of American Academy of Political and
Social Science 541, no. 1 (September 1995), 8-19.
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kind,7 irregular war,8 and fourth generation armed conflict9 among others. These usually pit the
state against organized armed groups. Armed groups play significant roles in the perpetration and
sustenance of this kind of conflict and one of the consequences of this new form of conflict is there
is a significant increase in mass atrocities targeted - directly or indirectly – at civilian populations.
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse cited in Harris and Kelly note these horrendous manifestations
when they observed that during the First World War, only five percent of casualties were among
the civilian population, while in the Second World War, the number of casualties from among
civilian populations was fifty percent.10 Since the 1990s however, they observed the number of
civilian population casualties has increased to an astonishing eighty percent. Although, these
scholars were referring to the late 1990s, the situation has not changed. Globally, civilians continue
to be the main casualties in situations of armed conflict.
There are at least two reasons for increased civilian casualties in contemporary armed conflict
contexts. First, the nature of contemporary armed conflict. Contemporary warfare is internal,
involves elements from within the state against the state, and often lacks a designated battlefield.
This makes communities the new battlefield. Furthermore, armed groups are not easily identifiable.
Moreover, because of the asymmetrical nature of their power compared to the state, armed groups
engage in hit-and-run tactics. They target state security forces and become mixed up with civilians.
In the process, civilians are caught in the crossfire. In 2010, Congolese civilians in the millions were
killed in the crossfire of the civil war between the national army and the various rebel groups in
the state.11 This gives credence to the popular African adage among the Yoruba of Southwestern
Nigeria, which states when two elephants fight, it is the grasses that suffer.
Second, civilians are increasingly targeted in contemporary armed conflict situations by nonstate armed groups. Armed groups, however, are not the only element involved in mass violence
against civilian populations in armed conflict. Civilians can, and are, targeted deliberately and
strategically by states either through the state’s security forces or deliberate policies. For instance,
during the Nigerian Civil War, the Nigerian military government led by General Yakubu Gowon
strategically imposed a policy of starvation on Biafran civilians in order to force the Biafran army
into submission.12 Furthermore, the Assad regime in Syria has been repeatedly identified as having
used chemical weapons on its own civilians in the on-going civil war. On the other hand, a state
may sponsor non-state armed groups to do its bidding, including killing civilians considered a
threat to the state. The oft-cited example of the Sudanese government’s use of the Janjaweed militia
to fight the Justice and Equality Movement is a key example. In the process, this led to the Darfur
genocide where between 200,000 and 400,000 black African civilians were murdered and millions
displaced in the space of three years.13
However, the mass violence perpetrated by armed groups can often be more barbaric and
horrendous in magnitude and severity. The armed conflict in Sierra Leone is one such example
of the atrocities perpetrated by some non-state armed groups on civilians. The atrocities and
mass violence directed at civilians over the course of the conflict were used as both a military
7

Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

8

Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, “Ethnic Cleavages and Irregular War: Iraq and Vietnam,” Politics and
Society, no. 2 (June 2007), 35. DOI: 10.1177/0032329207302403

Williams S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War
into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corp Gazette 85, no. 11 (October 1989), accessed November 25, 2018, https://www.
mca-marines.org/gazette/2001/11/changing-face-war-fourth-generation.
10
Peter Harris and Ben Reilly, eds., Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (Stockholm: International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998), accessed November 25, 2018, http://eprpinformation.org/files/
peaceprocesses/negotiations/ddrc_options-for-negociators-1of4.pdf.
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Robert I. Rotberg, “Deterring Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Cause of Our Era,” in Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future
Outrages, ed. Robert I. Rotberg. (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2010).
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For a detailed discussion of this recent literature see Chinua Achebe, There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra
(London: Penguin Books, 2012).
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Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch, “U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide: Khartoum and Arab Militias are Responsible,”
Washington Post, September 10, 2004, accessed October 28, 2018, http://www.washington.com/wp-dyn/article/A83642004sep9.html.
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and political weapon/strategy. Those amputated, gang-raped, mutilated, and abducted were
deliberately targeted to send a message to the Sierra Leonean government under Pa Tejan Kabbah.
During her field trip to Sierra Leone, Martha Foy narrated the story of a 50 year old widow who
was raped by a teenage rebel called commander “Don’t blame God” and subsequently had her two
legs amputated.
I pleaded but commander “Don’t blame God” said he was going to kill me if I don’t lie down.
I told him it had been such a long time since I had sex. During the rape, I was pleading with
him saying, “Don’t kill me, please don’t kill me.” He was so rough with me. Then he took me
up a big dune above Mattru village. As we were walking, he said he was going to kill me. I
pleaded with him and he said he was going to kill me, and then again said, “I have changed
my mind, I’m going to give you a letter.” When we got there I saw many more women, and
I was stripped naked down to my underwear. It was humiliating, then they asked me to sit
down and wait. Commander “Don’t Blame God” said, “I have a letter for you but wait for
the cutlass man to come.” Then the one with the matchet came and told me to put out my left
leg. It took them three chops with the cutlass to cut off my leg. After this, I beg them not to
cut my other leg but they struggled with me and a rebel held it down and cut it off...14

The quote above is a typical example of the mass atrocity crimes deliberated directed at civilians
by armed groups in armed conflict situations. Reason for this magnitude of atrocity committed by
armed non-state groups is that most members of armed groups are youths and children who are
not bounded by international conventions on armed conflict and war. Furthermore, unlike states
that are easily recognized in the international arena and can be sanctioned by the international
community when unregulated violence is used and, particularly against civilians, members of
NSAGs are usually faceless and unrecognized in the international arena.15
The previous explanation highlights a strong link between armed conflict and violence and the
commission of mass atrocities.16 In his study on the link between mass atrocities and armed conflicts,
Alex Bellamy lends credence to this point by bringing the linkage to the fore more succinctly with
statistical figures to show that armed conflict contexts provide a suitable environment for mass
atrocities. Accordingly, Bellamy highlights that out of 103 episodes of mass killing defined as
involving a minimum of 5000 civilians intentionally killed between 1945 and 2010, sixty-nine cases
- totaling sixty-seven percent -occurred within the context of armed conflict, and thirty-four cases
– totaling thirty-three percent -occurred in “peacetime.” Bellamy further notes that four of the
“peacetime mass atrocity cases out of the 34 occurred as post-war retribution in countries that had
recently experience armed conflict in which mass atrocities were committed.”17 The conclusion
that can be drawn from establishing a link between atrocities and armed conflict is that efforts
made to prevent, reduce, or address mass atrocity crimes must start with preventing, reducing,
or addressing armed conflict situations globally. By the same token, efforts at addressing armed
conflict must also take into account effective engagement with armed groups. Apart from the use
of crude violence, the presence or existence of these groups has the potential to undermine state

14

Martha Nsen Foy, “The Plight of Women and Children in Africa’s Armed Conflict Theatre with Special reference to
Sierra Leone” (PhD diss., University of Ibadan), 134.

15

The point being made here is that controlling the mass violence perpetrated by armed groups against civilians is more
difficult than that of the state because while the state may be forced, through the threat of sanctions, to use reasonable
violence by the international community, this does not apply to armed groups in most cases because they are not
recognized in the international community. For Instance, President Donald Trump bombed a military base in Syria to
retaliate the alleged Assad’s use of chemical against Syria civilians by Assad. This may have been difficult to carry out
on armed groups.

16

Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 2009), 1-369; Lawrence Woocher, “The Responsibility to Prevent: Towards a Strategy,” in Routledge
Handbook on the Responsibility to Protect, ed. Andy Knight and Frazer Egerton (London: Routledge, 2011), 22–35.

17

Alex Bellamy, “Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to
Prevent,” Policy Analysis Brief: Innovative Approaches to Peace and Security from the Stanley Foundation (Muscatine:
The Stanley Foundation, February 2011), 1-20, accessed November 25, 2018, https://www.stanleyfoundation.org/
publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf.
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and peacebuilding efforts. Therefore, effective engagement with armed groups by states is not only
necessary to prevent the commission of mass atrocities by armed groups against civilians, but to
also promote effective state- and peace-building in conflict and post-conflict societies.
There are three fundamental ways to respond to armed groups within a state. One is the use of
coercive power. In this case, the state uses its security forces and, particularly the military to crush
any uprising from NSAGs. This appears to have been the most popular state response to armed
groups especially since the 9/11 attack on the United States. However, this approach has proven to
be bloody with the potential to escalate violence and facilitate grave humanitarian costs for civilian
populations. Second, the use of a non-coercive approach such as the use of dialogue, amnesty
programs, or negotiating with armed groups. The third way involves the implementation of an
eclectic approach or what has been have referred to as the carrot and stick approach. This is a blend
of both coercive and non-coercive approaches. The question then is which of these approaches is
best to engage armed groups? In a study carried out in 2008 by Audrey Curth Cronin entitled
Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Defeating Al Qaida, Cronin opined that the best approach to ending the
activities of armed groups is the non-coercive approach.18 She underscores the counterproductive
nature of a military approach because it has the result of driving armed groups underground and
propels them to use guerrilla tactics against the military. As a consequence, a coercive approach
prolongs armed conflict because armed groups are rarely defeated by the military in such
situations. Cronin ended up by advising the United States of America to use non-coercive approach
in her engagement with al Qaida. Similarly, in 2008, Seth, Martin and Libicki carried out a study
on how armed groups have ended from 1968 to 2006.19 The research concluded that all armed
groups eventually end, but how they end differs based on the goal sought by the group. The study
discovered the ways in which armed groups leave armed violence have followed similar patterns,
which include joining the political process of the state,the arrest and killing of key members of
the group by local police and the intelligence agencies of the state, the victory of the armed group
over the state, and the use of military force of the state against the group. The study held that
the use of military force is the least productive avenue and the use of a non-coercive approach is
the most productive. Other studies, such as the worl of Crenshaw,20 Stedman,21 Dudouet,22 and
Hofman and Schneckener,23 have also pointed to the effectiveness of a non-coercive approach in the
engagement of NSAGs to reduce or totally end non-state armed groups’ violent action. The world
continues to witness an increase in the use of a non-coercive approach to state engagement with
armed groups. Even the United States of America, which has been promoting a global war against
terrorism, began to apply a non-coercive approach, particularly under the previous administration
of President Barrack Obama. Nigeria, too, has used a non-coercive approach (referred to as the
Amnesty Program) in her engagement of Niger Delta militant groups while also considering doing
the same to the Boko Haram militants in the North East. The problem, however, is that if the state
must use a non-coercive approach, how should it be implemented so as to promote sustainable
peace? This remains a critical question yet to be answered comprehensively. This paper will
answer this question by using the case study of the Nigeria and her use of a non-coercive approach
in the engagement of armed groups in the Niger Delta region. The central argument of the paper
18

Audrey Kurth Cronin, Ending Terrorism: Lesson for Defeating Al-Qaeda (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

19

Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, “How Terrorist Group End: Lesson for Countering Al Qa’ida” (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 2008), accessed November 25, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf.

20

Martha Crenshaw, “Why Violence is Rejected or Renounced: A Case Study of Oppositional Terrorism,” in A Natural
History of Peace, ed. Thomas Gregor. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996).

21

Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problem in Peace Process,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997), 5-53. DOI:
10.2307/2539366

22

Veronique Dudouet, “Mediating Peace with Proscribe Armed Groups,” USIP Special Report 239 (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace, May 2010), accessed October 28, 2018. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
SR239Duduoet.pdf.

23

Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, “How to engage Armed Groups? Reviewing Options and Strategies for
Third Parties,” in Security and Peace: Security Apparatuses in fragile and Authoritarian States, ed. Michael Brzoska, et al
(Bonn: Simon Koschut, 2011), 57-72.
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suggests that adopting a non-coercive approach in engaging armed groups in situations of armed
conflict is not enough to promote sustainable peace in post-conflict situations. The adoption of a
non-coercive engagement must comprise society-wide peacebuilding that is not only integrative,
but also promotes reconciliation and addresses the core problems and root causes of the grievances,
which morphed into open hostility and armed conflict.
A Non-Coercive Approach and Peacebuilding: Establishing the Link
The concept of peacebuilding can be traced to Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, which was
released in 1992. In the piece, Boutros-Ghali introduced what he called Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding was simply defined as any effort to construct a new environment
that makes a relapse back to conflict impossible. Boutros-Ghali tried to differentiate Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding from other concepts such as peacekeeping and peacemaking and also linked them
together, opining
peacebuilding should be viewed as counterpart of preventive diplomacy which seeks to
avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions. When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing
effort at peacemaking and peacekeeping come to play. Once these have achieved their
objectives, only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social,
cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation.24

For Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding was efforts to make a fragile peace durable through
peacemaking and peacekeeping. This is why he termed the phrase post-conflict peacebuilding.
However, John Paul Lederach outlines the concept of peacebuilding more clearly. In his book
titled Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies,25 Lederach notes the essence of
peacebuilding is to promote sustainable peace, which is not only limited to brokering a ceasefire,
negotiating a peace agreement or implementing a multifaceted peace accord, but also involves
making sure long time antagonists lay down their arms, and achieving an enduring reconciliation
framework by crafting a society-wide network of relationships and putting in place mechanisms
that promote justice and address the root cause of enmity. Lederach began his explanation by
looking at contemporary armed conflict globally and examining the characteristics of deeply
divided societies. He observed that contemporary armed conflicts are often caused by the failure
of governing structures to address the fundamental needs of the people, to ensure the equitable
distribution of wealth and benefit, which make identification with a particular group so attractive
and salient in a given setting. This can result in the formation of armed groups by aggrieved parties
to pursue their demands after several periods of peaceful agitation have not yielded any meaningful
results. More specifically, the political structures within which people operate often provide little
opportunity for the non-violent pursuit of socio-economic and political objectives. Lederach also
detailed the characteristics of deeply divided societies that often promote armed conflict. These
characteristics include a narrowing of identity couched in clan, ethnicity, religion or geographic/
regional affiliation, or a mixture of these that promote distrust, hatred and fear, which often fuel
conflict and, particularly between conflicting groups living in close proximity. What Lederach was
seeking to underscore is the issues that lead to the outbreak of armed conflict are typically related
to injustice, inequality, and unmet needs. In order to address these issues, therefore, conscientious
efforts must be made that involve employing a non-coercive approach such as dialogue and
reconciliation. Dialogue and reconciliation processes facilitate truth (acknowledgment of wrongs
and validation of painful loss and experiences leading to clarity); mercy (acceptance, forgiveness,
compassion, healing); justice (the search for individual and group rights, for social restructuring,
and for restitution), all of which are linked to sustainable peace.26 Rwanda and South African can
be highlighted as success stories of how reconciliation and dialogue processes have been used to
bring about peace in situations of intense armed conflict. In these two countries, acknowledgement
25

John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute
for Peace Press, 1998).

26

Ibid., 29.
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of wrong doing, healing by those affected by violence, and restitution through dialogue ushered
in peace.
The point being made here is that contemporary armed conflicts are caused by the structural
problems of contemporary societies and, particularly deeply divided ones. These problems cannot
be addressed through the implementation of a one-dimensional non-coercive approach. Rather, it
is essential a multidimensional non-coercive approach is employed that promotes dialogue and
negotiation to address the roots of the conflict. These are also necessary attributes that promote
reconciliation and peacebuilding. Any move short of this, even if it is non-coercive to the extent that
it does not involve the use of military force, is a false attempt to build peace. Crucially, any such
non-coercive engagement that is not premised on holistic peacebuilding may have the potential
to deepen a conflict situation, making it worse. The only way to address mass violence is through
policies that advance reconciliation and comprehensive peacebuilding.
The Development of the Niger Delta Armed Conflict in Nigeria
The Niger Delta crisis, that later developed into an armed confrontation, began as agitation for
political recognition within the Nigerian state during the pre-colonial period. Political elites
from the region used party politics, dialogue, and several other peaceful means to convey their
dissatisfaction. As Nigeria was moving towards independence, the British colonial authorities set
up a commission of inquiry known as the Henry Willink Commission to look into the fears of
minorities and make recommendations. However, the recommendations made by the commissionthe need for fundamental human rights and the establishment of the Niger Delta Development
Board- did not address the central concern of the Niger Delta people, which was adequate political
representation. In 1963, the Mid-Western region was carved out of the then Western region, but it
was not enough to address the issue of political recognition of the Niger Delta people as the Igbocontrolled political party, National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) dominated the greater
part of the core Niger Delta region.
The discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the 1970s further escalated the perceived
negligence and persistent development problem of the Niger Delta, which was compounded
by issues of environmental degradation that threatened the survival of the region’s people. The
discontent of the people of the Niger Delta increased because while the benefits of crude oil
exploration go to the federal government, the associated consequences of oil exploration are borne
solely by the people. The livelihood of the people, especially land (farming) and rivers (fishing)
have been destroyed as a result of oil exploration. This intensified the agitation of the people which
was expressed in non-violent forms of engagement, including negotiation, meetings, litigation,
and peaceful protest.27 However, all of these methods of engagement by the people were met
with a scorched earth approach by the government. This resulted in the development of a radical
response and the adoption of violent confrontation as the preferred means of engagement. Armed
confrontation in the Niger Delta crisis started in 1998 when the Ijaw Youth Council convened a
meeting of Ijaw youths at Kaiama to discuss the impoverishment of the Niger Delta region by
the federal government and oil companies.28 In 2006, armed struggle for resource control took on
another dimension with the establishment of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
Delta (MEND), as the umbrella body for all militant groups in the Niger Delta region, especially
of Ijaw extraction. The aim of the group was to carry out increased and coordinated attacks on oil
installations with the view to crippling Nigeria’s oil-dependent economy. Between 2006 and 2009,
the armed groups wreaked havoc on oil installations leading to a significant drop in oil exploration
and a fall in the revenue profile of the Nigerian state.

27

For extensive discussion of these non-violent approaches and how they have failed, see Christopher B.N. Ogbogbo,
“Niger Delta Peoples and the Resource Control Conflict, 1960-1995: An Assessment of Conflict Handling Styles,” in
Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa: Essays in Honour of General (Dr.) Abdulsalami A. Abubakar, ed. Isaac Olawale
Albert (Abuja: John Archers Press, 2005), 170-181.

28

Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, “Kidnapping in Pre- and Post- Amnesty Niger Delta, Nigeria,” International Journal of Peace
and Conflict 3, no. 2 (2016).
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Amnesty Program: The Non-Coercive Approach to Armed Conflict in the Niger Delta
Since 1998, when armed struggle was declared on the Nigerian state by Niger Delta armed
groups, the federal government has responded by deploying heavily armed military personnel to
the region. Most of these military outfits have been coded as Joint Task Forces. However, armed
insurrection continued to be intense with serious implications on oil exploration and revenue for
the Nigeria state. By 2009, oil exploration had drastically plummeted. As a result of the concerted
efforts of the armed groups, oil exploration fell from 2.6 million barrels per day to about 700,000
in the third quarter of 2009 prior to the implementation of the amnesty program. This made the
federal government consider an alternative approach to the management of the Niger Delta
crisis. The alternative approach taken by the government was the implementation of an amnesty
program on the Niger Delta militants. There were several problems with the implementation of
the amnesty program by the federal government in the Niger Delta region. Apart from deliberate
attacks on oil installations, militant groups were involved in a series of other anti-state activities
such as kidnappings, illegal oil bunkering, the drug trade, piracy, and attacks on government
security agents. The target of the federal government was to increase oil exploration and revenue.
The thinking of the Nigerian federal government was if armed groups ceased to exist, all other
activities associated with them would disappear. Thus, the amnesty program was couched in
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Disarmament meant every militant was
required to submit their weapons and demobilization referred to the disengagement of militant
from their various armed groups, while reintegration involved training them, and returning them
to their communities. A total of 30,000 militants were disarmed during the three phases. The total
number of militants disarmed and the caliber of weapons submitted gave the impression the
program was successful.
There were many problems with the implementation of the amnesty program. First, the
program was imposed on the armed groups from the federal government. As Albert29 has argued,
the concept of amnesty suggests a state of asymmetry in power relations between conflict parties,
in which the victorious side delivers an amnesty package as part of post-conflict peacebuilding
strategies. On the other hand, it can also come when both sides to the conflict acknowledge they
have been hurt by the conflict and require restitution. Therefore, to restore healthy relations, all the
parties will confess what they did to each other and ask for forgiveness. Forgiveness was supposed
to be the amnesty. In this case, however, those who introduced the amnesty program (the Nigerian
federal government) were not victorious over the militant groups. Nor were there any feelings
of guilt or hurt or the need for restitution felt by either the Niger Delta militants or the federal
government. However, the federal government packaged the amnesty program as something
benevolent towards the militant groups. Secondly, there was no any clarity (truth), healing
(mercy), and restitution (justice) sought before the implementation of the amnesty program. There
were many occasions when both government security forces and militants were involved in mass
atrocities, which have imbued hatred and distrust among civilians. The most obvious example
was the sacking of Odi, a small Ijaw village in Kolokuma/Opokuma, a local government area of
Bayelsa State, by government military forces in 1999. Report suggested members of Egbesus Boys
of Africa (EBA) abducted seven policemen, including a deputy commissioner dispatched to Odi
on an official assignment. Subsequently, they abducted and killed three soldiers traveling along
East-West road. The inability of the government of Bayelsa state to find and charge the culprits
led the President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, to deploy military personnel. The deployed military
personnel wreaked havoc on the residents of the village in a manner so unprecedented in the
history of Nigeria that it was deemed to have constituted genocide against the Ijaw people. The
report of twenty-nine human rights organizations, environmental rights groups, and civil society
movements that had visited the village on December 8, 1999, read
so ruthless, savage and thorough was the operation that it could have been intended to
achieve a genocidal outcome...We received reports of mass burial, mass cremation, and the
29
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disembowelment and mass dumping of corpse in River Nun. Two weeks after the operation,
the stench of decomposing bodies dumped into various creeks could still be perceived from
one kilometer to the town. We saw so many corpses as we drove along. The body of an old
man, still clutching firm to a copy of the Holy Bible, lay decomposing in a pond behind the
Anglican Church, a chilly testimony to the scorch-earth objective of the invading troops
contrary to the officially declared objectives of the mission: to arrest the hoodlums who
allegedly killed some policemen.30

The report added,
so complete was the destruction that crops were razed, yam barns were burnt, garri
processing plants were willfully wrecked, canoes were set ablaze, and every house in the
entire community with the exception of the First Bank, a Community Health Centre and the
Anglican Church, were burnt down. No aspect of the Community’s existence was spared.
Places of worship and other sacred places, including sacred forests and groves, churches,
ancestral homes and burial places were demolished. We received report that the soldiers
looted many of the buildings and made away with valuables before setting them ablaze. We
saw no single livestock, poultry and other domestic animal except a stray cat. The community
of 60,000 inhabitants had fled into the forest or been arrested or killed.31

The graffiti inscriptions left behind by the military personnel showed that the act was deliberately
orchestrated and targeted at the Ijaw. Such inscriptions include: “we will kill all Ijaws,” “Shame to
the Ijaw people,” “Odi where is your pride?,” “learn a lesson, visit Odi,” “Where is Egbesu,” “So
Odi youths, is this the end of Egbesu in Odi Village?,” “Thou will serve God the maker of Heaven
and Earth and not Egbesu,” “This land is for Soja, not for Ijaw,” “You bagers of Odi (Egbesu)
should be very careful with the living God,” “The wicked shall never go unpunished,” “The bible
said what shall an Odi man gain after losing his soul, lost the world and his home,” “Hi what is
going on? Man, how far? What about Odi, the HQ of the so called Egbesu?” “Who born Odi, Na
Egbesu,” “Silence! No noise. Egbesu is dead,” “Next time, even the trees will not be spared,” “Say
no to Egbesu, yes to Soldiers,” “Who is more important? Egbesu or Soldier? Soldier,” “Bayelsa will
be silent forever,” among others.32 This had created hatred between the people and the government
that needed to be addressed before amnesty was declared.
Third, the amnesty program was not preempted by any form of negotiation between the Niger
Delta people and the federal government. As a matter of fact, the implementation of amnesty was
supposed to be the concluding part of the reconciliation program implemented to address the
Niger Delta crisis. As Ledum Mittee commented,
the amnesty was supposed to be the end and not the beginning... I have my difficulty with
the way they have presented amnesty as a solution in itself. They seem to be saying that
we are not going to prosecute some people if they drop their arms and then that will bring
peace. Anybody who thinks that way, must be dreaming. We have got to a situation where
people do not trust the government when it comes to the issue of Niger Delta. And to change
this view, you must do something dramatic.33

Fourth, the program did not address the many problems of the Niger Delta region that had
fueled the Niger Delta crisis, inclusive of unemployment, poverty, environmental degradation,
and so forth. The thinking of the government was that the greater challenge to peace and security
was militant group activity and that once they were removed from the equation, peace would
return. Therefore, the government concentrated on the militants that emerged from the Niger Delta
crisis, while the core issues and root causes of the Niger Delta crisis were ignored. Even the DDR
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program organized for the militants was implemented haphazardly. The initial phase of the DDR
program, disarmament, was successful due to the large turnout of militants who submitted their
arms. The second and third phases of the DDR agenda, especially the reintegration stage, which is
an essential component of the program, was not implemented effectively.34 The way and manner
in which the amnesty program was implemented underscores that peace was bought, but not built.
The leadership of the various militant groups were given huge contracts running in the billions
of naira (Nigerian currency) to accept the amnesty program, to submit their arms, and encourage
their followers to do same.35 On the other hand, militant group foot soldiers enrolled in the amnesty
program have been given a monthly stipend of hundred and eighty dollars from 2009 to date. This
has encouraged militants to accept amnesty and submit a fraction of their arms to the state.
What effect did this have on peace and security in the Niger Delta and Nigeria more broadly?
The introduction of the amnesty program reduced armed conflict- the confrontation between state
security personnel and the militant group. It also led to an immediate increase in oil exploration
and the revenue profile of the Nigerian state. However, there was a significant increase in crimes,
including piracy, kidnapping, armed robbery, and oil bunkering, among others.36 Looking at
the circumstances under which the militant warlords increased their personal wealth through
the awarding of contracts and the manner in which their foot soldiers have been paid stipends
without any corresponding assignment, in the midst of many poor and unemployed youths, the
implementation of amnesty made militancy attractive to the youths of the region and promoted
a sense of impunity. In the words of one student from the Niger Delta University, [jokingly] “...
after my first degree I will go and join a militant group in my village. After all, there are no jobs out
there and one has to make a living. Maybe [the] government will call me, too, for amnesty....”37 This
statement is simple but loaded and shows the perception of many non-militants, but unemployed
youths in the Niger Delta region. Firstly, it highlights how the implementation of the amnesty
program was more of an incentive to indulge in violence than a solution to armed violence in the
Niger Delta region. Secondly, it also shows in spite of the implementation of the amnesty program,
militancy and militant groups still remain in the Niger Delta region. What kept militancy low in the
early period of the program was the then President of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, was
from the Niger Delta. As soon as he was defeated in 2015, militancy and armed conflict resumed.
Between January 2016 and July 2016, a new militant group calling itself the Niger Delta Avenger
(NDA) carried out thirty-four deadly attacks on oil installations. These attacks crush the Nigerian
oil-based economy and pushed the country back into recession.38
Ending Boko Haram Atrocities: Lesson from the Niger Delta Amnesty
As the tempo of armed insurrection was abating in the Niger Delta in 2009, Boko Haram
commenced its atrocities in the North East region of Nigeria. Although insurgency in the Niger
Delta has been largely motivated by resource control, the Boko Haram insurgency is motivated
by religious (especially Islamic) fundamentalism.39 The Boko Haram insurgency and responses to
34
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it (both government and local) have resulted in the commission of atrocities. While Boko Haram
attacks on Christians have caused inter-religious rivalry in most communities in the North East,40
government security agents have also alleged been involved in unlawful killings, illegal detentions,
dragnet arrests, intimidation, extortion, and other human rights abuses and atrocities. Various
reports from Amnesty International and Human Right Watch have accused Nigerian security
agencies, especially the army, of extra-judicial killings and torture of both Boko Haram and nonBoko Haram members.41 These have contributed significantly to an escalation of the conflict. Local
responses to the insurgency, including the formation of civilian joint task forces, vigilante groups,
and the hunters are not helping the matter. While people see these security outfits as necessary and
have applauded their actions against Boko Haram, their activities have only served to promote
retaliation, vengeance, and self help as most people who join these groups are those whose relatives
have been killed or maimed by members of Boko Haram. Their aim of joining is not only to protect
themselves and their immediate community, but to avenge attacks on their relative.42
Taking a cue from the perceived success of the use of a non-coercive approach in the Niger
Delta region, the federal government of Nigeria has shown the readiness to also grant amnesty
to the members of Boko Haram to end insecurity, terrorism, and armed conflict in the North East
Nigeria. The first attempt to grant amnesty to Boko Haram members was during the presidency
of Goodluck in 2013. After refusing the call from northern elites to grant amnesty to Boko Haram,
citing the facelessness of the group as a reason, he later agreed. A committee was set up to look
into the feasibility of the program. However, in a thirty minute video released a few days after,
Shekau, the leader of the group refused amnesty noting: “FG [the federal government], not us
needs Amnesty.”43 The issue reappeared in August 2015 when President Buhari was reported to
have approved amnesty for Boko Haram.44 Apart from the federal government, the Borno State
government under Ibrahim Shettima has repeatedly called for the need to use a political, noncoercive approach to end Boko Haram terrorism. During the inauguration of his regime on May
29, 2015, Shettima pledged to pursue amnesty for members of Boko Haram who were ready to
deradicalize, noting he would lobby the federal government to do so. However, lessons must
be learned from the Niger Delta amnesty program when considering the implementation of the
Boko Haram Amnesty program. The reconciliation process must be total and should not only
concentrate on Boko Haram members. Furthermore, it should be preceded by dialogue focused on
truth, healing, and restitution. It must be an amnesty program targeted towards building rather
than buying peace in order to diminish the potential for hostilities and armed conflict to reignite.
Conclusion
As cases of armed conflict between government forces and non-state armed groups continue to
increase globally and, particularly in developing countries, there may also be an increase in cases of
mass atrocities committed globally. The use of a non-coercive approach will continue to be a strategic
option for the modern state to reduce armed violence and mass atrocity crimes perpetrated by nonstate armed groups and prevent a prolonged stalemate between conflict parties. In addition to the
two cases included in this study, the Colombian case concerning the negotiated settlement between
40
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the government of Colombia and FARC45 that has gradually put an end to over five decades of
armed conflict is a case in point. The Colombian government accord with FARC also served as the
catalyst for the government to begin negotiations with the ELN.46 While a non-coercive approach to
the management of armed groups and armed violence in contemporary contexts of armed conflict
may be desirable, its implementation must be devoid of the perception that militants can be simply
pacified or rewards for displays of non-state armed violence. When a non-coercive approach is
implemented to pacify non-state armed groups, it may help to stem the tide of armed conflict and
violence in the short term, but it may also increase crime and convey an unintended message to
the people that the state is weak or rewards violence. This was the case in the Niger Delta region
whereby the government imposed amnesty to pacify militants, which reduced the armed conflict,
but increased crime significantly and led to the emergence of new militant groups and warlords.47
It was also for the same reason the peace deal struck between the Colombian government and
FARC was rejected by the Colombian people in a referendum as the people felt the deal was too
forgiving to FARC given the atrocities perpetrated by the group that had led to more than 260,000
deaths, the disappearance of tens of thousands, and the displacement of over 6 million people over
the five decades long war.48 Evidently, a non-coercive approach implemented to pacify non-state
armed groups cannot engender sustainable peace and security in countries experiencing non-state
armed, internal conflict. There is a need, therefore, to rethink the implementation of non-coercive
approaches to building sustainable peace. A non-coercive approach to promote sustainable peace
must be conscientiously implemented to heal the wounds created during the period of violent
conflict while also addressing political and socio-economic challenges undergirding grievances
that fostered and promoted armed conflict. This may involve strengthening institutions and
state governance structures, promoting transparency and accountability in government, tackling
poverty, unemployment, and other structural problems in the polity. Without more holistic policies
of reconciliation and peacebuilding, amnesty programs themselves will not end mass violence.
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